



MARKSCHEME

May 2014

HISTORY

Route 2

Higher Level

**Paper 3 – Aspects of the history
of Africa**

32 pages

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*Paper 3 markbands: The following bands provide a précis of the full markbands for paper 3 published in the History guide (2008) on pages 77–81. They are intended to assist marking, but must be used in conjunction with the full markbands found in the guide. **For the attention of all examiners: if you are uncertain about the content/accuracy of a candidate’s work please contact your team leader.***

0:	Answers not meeting the requirements of descriptors should be awarded no marks.
1–2:	Answers do not meet the demands of the question and show little or no evidence of appropriate structure. There is little more than unsupported generalization.
3–4:	There is little understanding of the question. Historical knowledge is present but the detail is insufficient. Historical context or processes are barely understood and there are little more than poorly substantiated assertions.
5–6:	Answers indicate some understanding of the question, but historical knowledge is limited in quality and quantity. Understanding of historical processes may be present but underdeveloped. The question is only partially addressed.
7–8:	The demands of the question are generally understood. Relevant, historical knowledge is present but is unevenly applied. Knowledge is narrative or descriptive in nature. There may be limited argument that requires further substantiation. Critical commentary may be present. There is an attempt to place events in historical context and show an understanding of historical processes. An attempt at a structured approach, either chronological or thematic has been made.
9–11:	Answers indicate that the question is understood, but not all implications considered. Knowledge is largely accurate. Critical commentary may be present. Events are generally placed in context, and historical processes, such as comparison and contrast, are understood. There is a clear attempt at a structured approach. Focus on AO1, AO2 and AO4. Responses that simply summarize the views of historians cannot reach the top of this markband.
12–14:	Answers are clearly focused on the demands of the question. Relevant in-depth knowledge is applied as evidence, and analysis or critical commentary is used to indicate some in-depth understanding, but is not consistent throughout. Events are placed in context and there is sound understanding of historical processes and comparison and contrast. Evaluation of different approaches may be used to substantiate arguments presented. Synthesis is present, but not always consistently integrated. Focus on AO3 and AO4.
15–17:	Answers are clearly structured and focused, have full awareness of the demands of the question, and if appropriate may challenge it. Accurate and detailed historical knowledge is used convincingly to support critical commentary. Historical processes such as comparison and contrast, placing events in context and evaluating different interpretations are used appropriately and effectively. Answers are well-structured and balanced and synthesis is well-developed and supported with knowledge and critical commentary.
18–20:	Answers are clearly focused with a high degree of awareness of the question and may challenge it successfully. Knowledge is extensive, accurately applied and there may be a high level of conceptual ability. Evaluation of different approaches may be present as may be understanding of historical processes as well as comparison and contrast where relevant. Evaluation is integrated into the answer. The answer is well-structured and well-focused. Synthesis is highly developed.

Following a review of marking practices it has been agreed that in order to add further clarity to the markscheme for Paper 3, all caveats with regard to the awarding of marks for questions that include more than one component (eg, compare and contrast; reasons and significance; methods and success) will be removed.

*Examiners and moderators are reminded of the need to apply the markbands that provide **the ‘best fit’** to the responses given by candidates and to **award credit wherever it is possible to do so**. If an answer indicates that the demands of the question are understood and addressed but that **not all implications are considered (eg, compare or contrast; reasons or significance; methods or success)**, then examiners should not be afraid of using the full range of marks allowed for by the markscheme: ie, responses that offer good coverage of some of the criteria should be rewarded accordingly.*

Pre-colonial African states (Eastern and Central Africa) 1840–1900

1. **“Johannes/Yohannis IV was a more successful ruler than Tewodros II because he succeeded in reunifying Ethiopia.” To what extent do you agree with this statement?**

Tewodros II is regarded as the first modern ruler of Ethiopia. Emerging from obscurity on the margins of Ethiopian society, he earned the loyalty of a devoted band of followers and proceeded to defeat one rival after another before being crowned emperor in 1855. Shortly afterwards, he subdued and incorporated into his empire the powerful provinces of Wollo, Shewa and Gojjam. By doing so he brought an end to the so-called *Zemane Mesafint*, or “era of the princes”, the period of chaos that had characterized Ethiopian politics for over a century when regional warlords ruled the roost. Tewodros’s modernizing reforms were extremely ambitious but provoked much disaffection, and following the death of his wife his rule became increasingly arbitrary and violent. Slighted when a letter to Queen Victoria did not receive a prompt reply, his decision to imprison a number of foreigners resulted in the famous Napier expedition in 1868. Deserted by his army and with many of his *rases* now in open revolt, Tewodros committed suicide rather than surrender to the British. Upon his death Ethiopia once again lacked an effective central government.

Yohannis IV took advantage of the arms provided to him by the British in return for his support against Tewodros, and used these to defeat his main rival before being crowned emperor in 1872. He conciliated the most powerful of the *rases*, including Tekle Haymanot of Gojjam and Menelik of Shewa, by allowing them to exercise considerable political autonomy within their own provinces. His rule was characterized by constant external threats to Ethiopia’s independence. Together with his redoubtable general Ras Alula, he twice defeated the Ottoman Egyptians and then the Sudanese Mahdists and Italians, and concluded the Hewitt Treaty with the British in 1884. He was killed by a sniper in a second confrontation with the Sudanese Mahdist army in 1889. Unlike Tewodros, the unity of the Ethiopian state survived Yohannis.

Some candidates may note that while Tewodros’s efforts to unify the country ended in failure, he did at least re-establish the principle of strong, centralized authority in the country. This was something his successors could build on. Furthermore, Yohannis’s state was less centralized than that of Tewodros, and the result was that it experienced frequent centrifugal pressures. Indeed, his nominal vassal and successor as emperor, Menelik, refused to join forces with him when he was confronted with the Sudanese Mahdist invasion that took his life in 1889. The survival of the unitary Ethiopian state was only guaranteed when Menelik II established Addis Ababa as a permanent capital and defeated the Italians at Adowa. It could also be argued that the measure of “success” of each ruler should be wider than their ability to unify the country. Tewodros had a grand modernizing vision, and among his achievements were the raising of revenues through taxation, the creation of a standing army, and ambitious projects to build roads and other infrastructure, including a workshop to manufacture armaments. He also sought to limit the power of the Orthodox clergy. However, he alienated conservative elements in the process and this factor contributed to his eventual demise. Yohannis’s approach was more cautious and his objectives altogether more modest. His reign was dominated by the need to restore central authority and protect his country from foreign invasion.

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2. **Analyse the reasons for the rise of either the Lozi state under Lewanika or the Unyamwezi state under Mirambo.**

The Lozi emerged as a powerful kingdom over much of the western part of present-day Zambia in the second half of the 19th century. Having been subjugated by the Kololo, a Sotho group fleeing the Mfecane from the south in the 1820s, the Lozi reestablished their independence in 1864. The Kololo had been severely weakened as a result of having to live in the malarial floodplains of the region, an environment to which they were unaccustomed. Following the restoration of Lozi power, Lewanika became *litunga* in 1878 and attempted to create a more centralized government, but he was ousted in 1884 in a revolt that was all too typical of Lozi politics at the time. On his return to the kingship a year later, Lewanika moved to consolidate his rule. Rivals were purged, and he appointed members of his own family to positions of authority. All military regiments were placed under his personal command, and his standing among the Lozi peasantry was bolstered by the resurrection of a cult of divine kingship. A successful agricultural economy facilitated the emergence of a strong centralized state, which quickly expanded at the expense of its neighbours. The Ila and Tonga peoples to the east were conquered, and the Lozi extracted food, cattle and slaves as tribute. The trade in ivory was extended, particularly to the west with the Portuguese in Angola. European traders and missionaries, including those from the Paris Mission Society, were also welcomed. Lewanika appreciated the potential benefits of collaboration with Europeans while rarely losing sight of the dangers of this strategy. Indeed, Lozi survival was assured by Lewanika's adroit dealings with would-be conquerors, and he managed to preserve his kingdom, and his personal rule over it, until well into the colonial period.

Mirambo began his career as a minor 19th century trader and warlord but went on to dominate much of the central and western areas of present-day Tanzania, in the state of Unyamwezi. His emergence as a political force coincided with the sudden and rapid expansion of the Arab–Swahili trade in ivory and slaves between the Great Lakes region and the coast. Mirambo was in an ideal position to exploit the new economic opportunities because Unyamwezi was situated right at the heart of the complex network of trade routes. His initial rise was facilitated by the political complexion of the region. There were well over a hundred separate and divided Unyamwezi polities, and most were uncertain about how to respond to the new challenges posed by the arrival of Arab traders and European missionaries. Mirambo was more decisive, and he was able to take advantage of the military strategies he had learned from the Tuta Ngoni, a marauding group which had originally fled north from the destruction of the Mfecane. He won the loyal support of his troops, who were offered a share in any spoils of conquest, and used the firearms traded with Arabs and Europeans against his enemies. He defeated some rival groups militarily, while others were intimidated or incorporated into the expanding Unyamwezi state through the power of his diplomacy. Between 1871 and 1875 his mercenary army, the *rugaruga*, fought a series of wars with the Arabs. Despite the immense odds stacked against him the outcome of the conflict was inconclusive, and the military acumen he displayed was such that Stanley referred to him as the “Napoleon of Central Africa”. He was now able to levy a toll on all trade through his kingdom, and the revenues which poured in allowed Unyamwezi to flourish. Mirambo also welcomed Christian missionaries as he wished to maintain cordial relations with the British consul in Zanzibar. They had little influence on his statecraft, and indeed Mirambo made little effort to create a centralized administration. His state rapidly disintegrated after his death in 1884, and this factor alone suggests that the personality of Mirambo was in large part responsible for the fleeting rise of Unyamwezi.

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Pre-colonial African states (Southern and West Africa) 1800–1900

3. **“The main cause of the Mfecane was the rise of the Zulu kingdom under Shaka Zulu, while its most important effect was the rise of the Sotho kingdom under Mosheshwe.” To what extent do you agree with this statement?**

It is obviously true that the Zulus under Shaka had a key role to play in unleashing the convulsions of warfare and population displacement that swept Southern Africa in the early 19th century, and that the creation of the Sotho state under Mosheshwe was one important result. However, the statement in the question is a gross over-simplification of the causes and consequences of the Mfecane, and candidates should be expected to challenge it strongly.

The series of wars among the Nguni peoples of the region began when Chief Dingiswayo of the Mthethwa allied with the Tsonga and blocked access to the Portuguese trading post of Delagoa Bay to his rival, Zwide of the Ndwandwe. In the ensuing battle Dingiswayo was defeated and killed, and the remnants of his armies joined with a small but emerging force in the region: the Zulus under Shaka. Shaka in turn defeated Zwide and incorporated the Ndwandwe, and began a dual process where he extended his own kingdom while initiating a chain reaction of violence, as rivals fled from the carnage and in turn attacked other groups where they settled. Shaka’s military innovations were crucial to the process, as these were mimicked by his victims who then used them against other groups. These included the use of the *iklwa*, a short stabbing spear used to devastating effect in close combat, the adoption of the “ox-head” battle formation, and the organization of troops into the *impi* age grade regiments. The practice of sparing only the women and young men of vanquished foes and absorbing them into the wider Zulu population was also widely copied. In spite of these points, some historians have downplayed the significance of Zulu agency in the Mfecane, and instead emphasized certain environmental and external factors which destabilized Nguni society. A rise in agricultural output due to the introduction of corn led to population increases across the region and a rise in the number of young men of fighting age, while prolonged droughts in the first two decades of the century put added pressure on the burgeoning Nguni kingdoms and intensified competition for resources. The presence of Portuguese traders in Delagoa Bay was important as different groups competed for control over the lucrative trading routes. Slave raids, both from Delagoa Bay in the north and for the Cape labour market in the south, were an increasingly common and disruptive feature of the period.

Mosheshwe used diplomacy and statecraft in order to bring refugees from the fighting under his protection and incorporate them into his Sotho mountain kingdom. He became an important political actor in the region in his own right and fought defensive wars against the British and Boers. He finally requested that Basutoland become a British protectorate, which Britain agreed to in 1868. Nonetheless, the impact of the Mfecane went far beyond the emergence and growth of the Sotho state. The displacement of the Ndebele, led by Mzilikazi, to the Transvaal resulted in the widespread destruction of that region. The arrival of Boer trekkers in the South African interior in the 1830s and 1840s led to a series of wars between the two which resulted in the Ndebele being driven north of the Limpopo, where they established a powerful new state in present-day Zimbabwe. Devastation and depopulation allowed the Boers to settle much of the area that later became the Orange Free State and Transvaal. Another result was the creation of several new Nguni kingdoms, including the Gaza, Swazi and Kololo, as the impact of the Mfecane was felt far and wide. Not least of its effects, of course, was the emergence of a formidable Zulu nation, and the threat that this posed to Boer and British interests in the region.

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4. Compare and contrast the roles of Usman Dan Fodio in the rise of the Sokoto caliphate and Samori Toure in the rise of the Mandinka Empire.

Usman Dan Fodio was a Fulani cleric who led a jihadist uprising which overthrew the Hausa states of northern Nigeria before establishing the Sokoto Caliphate in 1809. Samori Toure was a 19th century Dyula trader and soldier in the highlands of eastern Guinea, who defeated and co-opted rival Dyula groups before integrating them into his expanding Mandinka Empire.

The rise of the two states was due in large part to the personal charisma and political astuteness of their respective leaders. Each was able to exploit the disorganization and divisions of his opponents: Dan Fodio of the numerous Hausa states, where peasants had become alienated from the ruling emirs and were willing to join him in revolt; and Samori of rival Dyula groups, which were divided among themselves after centuries of warfare. Economic factors were important in the rise of each state. Pastoralism was the lifeblood of Hausa and Fulani society, and Dan Fodio criticized Hausa rulers for their excessive taxation of peasant cattle herds. The development of plantation agriculture was another factor in the growth of the caliphate. In the case of Samori, his background as a trader and the sale of gold and ivory allowed him to purchase the guns which were crucial to his early victories, and a flourishing trade-based economy was the key to the growth and consolidation of the Mandinka state.

While Dan Fodio and Samori both led Islamic states, religion was the more important factor in the rise of the Sokoto Caliphate. Dan Fodio was able to persuade his fellow Fulani, and some Hausa, to rise up against a ruling elite which he considered not just oppressive but also increasingly un-Islamic in its conduct. He attacked the “heretical” Hausa emirs for their venality and love of luxury, and for mixing traditional beliefs with their Muslim faith. Both cemented their personal leadership by stressing credentials which extended beyond their mere political authority. In the case of Dan Fodio this implied his status as an educator and theologian. Samori, by contrast, relied more on his reputation as a military strategist and diplomat. His strengths lay in armed conquest and persuading rival rulers that their interests lay in being part of a powerful Mandinka trading empire. While he did promote Muslim identity and Islamic law as a means of strengthening his rule, he also fostered a strong popular attachment to the idea of Mandinka statehood and identity in order to tighten his authority. Samori consolidated Mandinka power by building a strong centralized administration, while the Sokoto Caliphate under Dan Fodio was organized more federally. Individual emirs, having proven their loyalty to Dan Fodio, exercised considerable political autonomy from the centre.

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European imperialism and annexation of Africa 1850–1900

5. In what ways did the agreements reached at the Berlin West Africa Conference of 1884–1885 have an impact on the “scramble for Africa”?

The Berlin West Africa Conference was convened by German Chancellor Bismarck in 1884 following a suggestion from Portugal, which wanted to use the gathering in order to formalize its claims to the Congo estuary. It was attended by 12, mostly European, powers. Bismarck’s objective was to regulate the scramble for African territory which was now underway, and so prevent the outbreak of a European war over the continent. In terms of formal agreements, the results of the conference were rather modest. These included a commitment to the free navigation of the Congo and Niger rivers and freedom of trade on the Congo, a guarantee of the political neutrality of the Congo basin, and a number of clauses which established the “ground rules” for the scramble – most notably the need for “spheres of influence” and for an imperial power to demonstrate “effective occupation” in support of a territorial claim. Other resolutions committed the colonial powers to eradicating slavery and to upholding the rights and promoting the interests of Africans, but these were mostly ignored in practice. More important were the territorial agreements reached between the main powers outside of the main conference. British influence in the southern Niger was recognized by the French, and France won support for its claim to the north bank of the Congo. Most significantly, perhaps, there was recognition by most of the other powers for King Leopold of Belgium’s demand to administer the Congo basin region as a Congo Free State, with access to the sea. This meant that Portugal was the principal loser at Berlin. The requirement of effective occupation also undermined its claim to the hinterland of its two coastal possessions in Southern Africa.

Some candidates may note that the Berlin Conference did not actually precipitate the scramble, which in some parts of the continent was already well underway. As evidence of this, “creeping colonialism” had resulted in the extension of European sovereignty along coasts and even into the West African interior. Britain had occupied Egypt in 1882, much to the chagrin of the French, and a British attempt to forcibly federate South Africa had come unstuck in 1881. They might also argue that far from regulating colonial expansion as Bismarck had intended, the Conference actually generated a further wave of imperialism as colonial powers and their agents scrambled to outdo each other by signing treaties with African rulers in order to provide evidence of effective occupation. Germany itself entered the scramble by declaring protectorates over Togo, the Cameroons, South West Africa and Tanganyika. Britain responded by declaring crown colonies or protectorates in the Niger Coast Protectorate in 1894, the East Africa Protectorate in 1895, Sierra Leone in 1896, Sudan in 1898, and Northern Nigeria in 1900. It also moved to strengthen its dominant position in South Africa. France expanded into much of West and Equatorial Africa, and almost fought a war with the British following the famous Fashoda Incident in 1898. By the end of the century, virtually the entire continent of Africa had been brought under European control.

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6. “Strategic factors are more important than economic factors in explaining the European annexation of Africa.” To what extent do you agree with this statement?

The economic argument for the “scramble for Africa” is very well known. In an age of industry, European powers identified Africa as a valuable source of raw materials and an enormous potential marketplace for manufactured goods. In West Africa in particular, legitimate trade had been encouraged early in the 19th century as a means of replacing the slave trade. By the 1870s this had become very profitable, with European traders typically exchanging goods such as cloth, gin and firearms for raw materials and minerals such as palm oil, rubber, cotton, copper and gold. As commercial rivals from other countries clamoured for influence in the region and the interests of European traders were directly threatened by emerging African polities, colonial agents responded by extending their hitherto limited jurisdiction farther along coasts and even inland, thereby precipitating the scramble. The exercise of “informal imperialism” gave way to the formal partitioning of the continent.

Hobson and Lenin further argue that a lengthy economic recession in Europe, which began in the 1870s, led to diminishing rates of return for investors in domestic markets. At the same time, countries erected tariff barriers in order to protect their own industries. European powers sought alternative outlets for the investment of so-called surplus capital as well as markets for industrial goods, and identified colonies in Africa as the ideal solution to their problems. At a time of rising unemployment, many policymakers also viewed colonies as a potential outlet for surplus population. Critics of the economic argument point to the following: the ready availability of raw materials (such as machine lubricants and rubber) elsewhere in the world; the limited political influence of the industrial lobby groups; the limited investment of European powers in their African colonies and the fact that large-scale European settlement of colonies was not encouraged until much later. The thrust of this argument is that the economic benefit accruing to European powers as a result of colonizing Africa was negligible, and that powers like the British were in fact very reluctant to take on the burden of formal occupation in the first place, precisely because of the heavy costs involved. A partial counter to this position is that European powers may have taken part in the partition of Africa not with the intention of making a quick profit, but rather of staking out economic claims for the future.

The strategic argument was most famously propounded by Robinson and Gallagher, who located much of the early activity of the scramble in Egypt and South Africa. These two countries were regarded as crucial to the British because of their strategic location on the sea routes to the “jewel in the crown” of their empire, India. Egypt was considered particularly important after the completion of the Suez Canal in 1869. The nationalist revolt of Urabi Pasha threatened the stability of the country, and this resulted in military intervention in 1882. French anger at the British occupation led to the breakdown of the so-called “gentleman’s agreement” in West Africa, which in turn generated the scramble there. Britain attempted to federate South Africa, which was also of vital strategic importance on the sea route to the east, by crushing the independence of the Boer republics in order to keep imperial rivals like Germany and Portugal out of the region. This factor also led to them declaring protectorates over a number of Southern African kingdoms. It can also be argued that there were strong strategic motivations for Germany’s involvement in the scramble. Bismarck had long sought to encourage the imperial designs of other powers in Africa (especially the French) in order to keep them divided and distracted from the affairs of Europe. His sudden and unexpected entry into the scramble in 1884 has been explained as a desire to acquire colonies in order to use them as diplomatic “bargaining chips”. Critics of the strategic argument have stressed the absence of any strong strategic motives in one area of the continent where much of the early activity of the scramble took place: West Africa. They also point to the role in the scramble of the so-called “men on the spot”, whose initiatives in extending imperial control often ran counter to the wishes of their governments. Some candidates may well develop a synthesis answer incorporating both the

economic and strategic arguments, with the weighting of each factor differing according to the region of the continent. Students may also evince other explanations of the scramble in their answers, such as the coincidence of a number of facilitative factors (like technological advances and the disintegration of a number of powerful African states in the decades preceding the partition), so long as the principal focus remains economic and strategic factors. Alternatively, they might also point towards African obduracy in some areas as a factor in the comparatively late arrival of formal empire on the continent.

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Response to European imperialism (Eastern and Central Africa) 1880–1915

7. How successful were the responses of Kabaka Mwanga and Apolo Kagwa of Buganda to the threat of European imperialism between 1884 and 1900?

Some candidates may, in their answers, differentiate between the strategies of Kabaka Mwanga and Apolo Kagwa, and argue that of the two Kagwa's response to the threat of imperialism was much the more successful. Kabaka Mwanga presided over the gradual loss of Kiganda independence, first to the Imperial British East Africa Company (IBEAC) and then the British Crown, until he was finally ousted from power in 1897 and sent into exile. From the moment he became *kabaka* in 1884, he faced numerous threats to the independence of his country. Like his father Mutesa, his success rested on his ability to balance the interests and power of the three religious factions, Muslim, Protestant and Catholic, at his court. Unlike Mutesa, who was a master of political intrigue and manipulation, Mwanga was callow and impetuous, and his diffidence towards religion made him enemies among the different missionary groups. The sudden arrival of the Germans as a colonizing threat in 1885 unsettled Mwanga, and probably triggered his decision to order the murder of the Protestant Bishop Hannington who was approaching Buganda from the strategically sensitive south-eastern region. The result was a massacre of Christians, and in an ensuing civil war Mwanga was temporarily overthrown by the combined forces of the religious factions, which then battled among themselves for the succession. The arrival of Frederick Lugard of the IBEAC in Buganda in 1890 was the decisive factor in the outcome, as he decided to back the Protestants. Mwanga had earlier agreed a protection treaty with the IBEAC in order to return as *kabaka*, and was angered by Lugard's failure to consult him and by what he perceived as IBEAC favouritism towards the Protestant faction. Relations with the IBEAC continued to deteriorate, resulting in the diminution of Mwanga's powers and the steady erosion of Kiganda independence. Buganda was officially declared a British protectorate in 1894 when the company ran into financial trouble. Mwanga finally fled Kampala and revolted in 1897. His Christian chiefs, foremost among them Apolo Kagwa, supported the British and Mwanga's rebellion was easily defeated.

Some candidates may judge Apolo Kagwa's strategy of defying Mwanga and collaborating with the British to be the much more successful strategy. A Protestant convert at Mwanga's court, he was named regent after the *kabaka* was deposed in 1897. He negotiated the Uganda Agreement with Harry Johnston in 1900 which established the basis of British rule in the colony. Buganda was to enjoy a special status within Uganda with a semblance of autonomy, and would be able to extend its territory at the expense of groups such as the Bunyoro. The Baganda parliament, or *lukiko*, was allowed to spend funds without supervision, and no new direct taxes could be raised without its consent. The Baganda were able to exercise a sort of "sub-imperialism" over other groups in colonial Uganda. It can be argued that Kagwa manipulated the colonial power in order to serve his own ends in a game of African power politics, and thus did far more to defend Baganda interests in the face of the imperialist challenge than Kabaka Mwanga.

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8. Analyse the causes of John Chilembwe’s rising in Malawi in 1915, and the results for both Africans *and* the colonial power.

John Chilembwe was an American-educated Baptist minister who led a short-lived and ill-fated uprising against the British in Nyasaland in 1915. Following the colonization of the territory in 1891, the British had encouraged missionary activity as a means of “civilizing” and controlling the local population. Chilembwe came under the patronage of the independent-minded Baptist Joseph Booth, who took him on a tour of America in 1887. Here he was introduced to the work of writers and activists like Booker T Washington and Marcus Garvey, and was heavily influenced by the Africanist ideas that were popular at the time. On returning to Nyasaland he established his own Providence Industrial Mission and became increasingly politicized as the weight of colonial occupation bore heavily on his community. Chilembwe stressed the importance of hard work and self-help, but found that his efforts to educate and improve the lot of peasant farmers were undermined by the authorities. A white settler-based plantation economy was set up and a poll tax and hut tax levied on Africans by a government determined to generate a supply of cheap labour for European agriculture. A famine in 1913 and the resulting flood of refugees from Mozambique heaped pressure on already distressed communities. Chilembwe was outspoken in condemning the authorities and decrying the exploitation of Africans by plantation owners, and a number of his schools and churches were torched in retribution. Following the outbreak of the First World War the British introduced conscription and Africans were commandeered to fight against the Germans in Tanganyika. When a letter of protest to the authorities received no reply, an embittered Chilembwe decided to take up arms and instructed his followers to “strike a blow and die”.

Chilembwe’s revolt quickly unravelled. After three plantation owners were killed, he attempted to escape but was captured and shot. The British response was swift and brutal as a large number of his supporters were executed. The forced recruitment of Africans to the British army was accelerated. The Watchtower Movement, a millenarian group that had become a focus of anti-colonial agitation in Nyasaland, was suppressed. The longer-term political influence of African independent churches, however, could not be mitigated by the crackdown. A commission of inquiry was established to look into the revolt, but no serious reforms resulted from its report. It is improbable that Chilembwe had any realistic hope of instigating a general uprising against British rule through his rebellion. More likely, he viewed his action as symbolic and hoped that his martyrdom would inspire future generations of his countrymen. However it was not until much later that the Nyasaland National Congress was formed, and Malawi did not win its independence until 1964. Nonetheless, the long-term legacy of the rising was significant. For the British, the myth of a paternalistic and benevolent colonial system was exploded as the moral legitimacy of imperialism came under challenge. Chilembwe himself, as leader of a revolt that was national rather than tribal in character, soon became an icon for nationalist movements not just in Malawi but across the continent.

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Response to European imperialism (Southern and West Africa) 1870–1920

9. Assess the reasons for, and consequences of, British intervention in Asante during the period 1870 to 1920.

Anglo-Asante tension mounted over the course of the 19th century as the British attempted to protect and extend the commercial interests of their coastal forts and eliminate the slave trade in the interior. Coastal peoples such as the Fante and Ga sought British protection, and a series of incursions by the Asante resulted in periodic British intervention on behalf of their allies. The Treaty of Fomena, which followed the Second Anglo-Asante War of 1875, confirmed British supremacy over the Gold Coast and required the Asante to pay an annual indemnity to the British government. However, having defeated the Asante in battle, the reluctance of the British to bear the costs of occupation meant that they opted to withdraw, leaving a defeated and severely weakened Asante. A slow flaking away of Asante power ensued as different states in the confederation rebelled against Kumasi with British encouragement. After Asante fortunes revived in the 1880s, another Anglo-Asante war was declared by the British in 1896 on the pretext of the Asante refusal to pay their annual tribute. Other reasons were more likely. An earlier offer of a British protectorate had been rejected by the *asantehene*, and armed intervention provided the opportunity to impose one by force. In addition, the new imperial-minded Colonial Secretary Joseph Chamberlain probably had his eye on the mineral wealth of the Asante goldfields. The British were determined to secure the Gold Coast hinterland in order to forestall the recovery of the Asante Confederation and to pre-empt a possible alliance between Asante and the Mandinka Empire of Samori Toure. They also wanted to prevent Asante from falling into the hands of either of their main colonial rivals in the region, the French and the Germans.

The immediate consequences of the military expedition of 1896 were the enforced signing of a Treaty of Protection by Asantehene Prempeh, and his eventual exiling to the Seychelles. Following the demand of British Governor Hodgson for the surrender of the Golden Stool a rebellion broke out in 1900, led by Yaa Asantewaa, the queen mother of Edwoso state. After spirited resistance the revolt collapsed in 1901 and Asante was declared a Crown colony a year later. Although Asante independence had come to an end, the British policy of indirect rule meant the perpetuation of traditional systems of chiefly authority into the colonial era. However, Asante representatives, unlike those from other parts of the colony, were not permitted to sit in the consultative Legislative Council until long after its establishment.

As far as economic factors are concerned, an economic infrastructure was developed as cocoa cultivation was extended. The establishment of the Ashanti Goldfields Corporation allowed for a more commercial exploitation of the region's gold reserves, although this tended to benefit European prospectors more than it did the Asante. Export revenues funded the creation of a basic system of primary and secondary education in Asante, and in 1914 the outbreak of the First World War saw the establishment of a Gold Coast Regiment, from which many Asante were recruited.

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10. Assess the reasons why Khama decided to collaborate with the British, while the Herero and the Nama chose to resist the threat of conquest by the Germans?

The differences in the response of the Herero and the Nama to German pressure on the one hand, and that of Khama to the British on the other, offer a clear illustration of the contrasting strategies of resistance to and collaboration with the colonizing power. Germany's declaration of a protectorate over South West Africa in 1884 had an immediate impact on the Herero and Nama peoples of the region. Herero and Nama land was regarded as some the most desirable in the territory. The old pastoral way of life of the two groups, dependent as it was on free access to pasture, immediately came under pressure. The situation was quite complex, however, and stronger candidates might point out that the pattern of relations between colonizer and colonized was not initially one of straightforward resistance. For instance, the Herero leader Kamaherero had signed a protection treaty with the German government in 1885 in order to win support against his traditional rivals, the Nama. It was Germany's violation of this agreement that led to the initial breakdown in relations. After 1890, the German government's policy of promoting white settlement in the colony led to the widespread expropriation of Herero and Nama land. Theft of African cattle by German ranchers became commonplace, and a rinderpest epizootic severely depleted what was left of Nama and Herero herds. The planned construction of the Otavi railway, which was mooted at the time of the 1904 revolt, would have resulted in the loss of even more Herero land to the government. German traders had exploited Africans by lending them money to replenish their cattle stocks at usurious rates, and a moratorium announced by the government in 1903 had the unintended effect of encouraging lenders to recover their debts as quickly and brutally as possible. The practice of enslaving Herero and Nama to work on the European ranches was also increasingly common, and the possibility of confinement to a native reserve was a distinct one. Finding themselves at the mercy of a rapacious and racist colonial state, the Nama and Herero were driven to desperation. The Nama rebelled in 1903 and the Herero, under the leadership of Kamaherero's son Samuel, did the same a year later. The results were utterly catastrophic for both.

While Khama – like Samuel Maherero and the Nama leader Hendrik Witbooi – was baptized and educated by Lutheran missionaries, his early contacts with Europeans were more positive. The threat of white encroachment on the land of the Bamangwato was only beginning to materialize when he became king in 1875. A devout Christian, Khama was acutely aware of the relative weakness of his kingdom in the face of challenges posed by Ndebele raids from the north, Boer pressure from the south, and German incursions from the west. He was at the same time determined to use his diplomatic skills in order to preserve Bamangwato independence. Together with his missionary friend John Mackenzie, Khama petitioned the British to declare a protectorate over his country. In 1885 he eventually succeeded in winning over a British government that was by now convinced that the strategic threat posed by the Germans to their dominance in the region needed countering. However, Cecil Rhodes and his British South Africa Company (BSAC) also had designs on the mineral wealth of Bechuanaland. Rhodes was able to browbeat the British authorities into dividing Khama's territory in two, with the Bamangwato retaining nominal sovereignty of the Bechuanaland Protectorate to the north of the Molopo River. Further pressure from Rhodes resulted in Khama travelling to London in 1895, where he was able to persuade the government to reverse an earlier promise of the Protectorate to the BSAC. Bechuanaland remained a protectorate until its independence in 1966. Khama had been able to identify a potential collaborationist partner whose strategic interest was in the end served by declaring a protectorate over an African ally. The Herero and the Nama were not as fortunate.

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Developments in South Africa 1880–1994

11. Assess the reasons for the creation in 1910 of a Union of South Africa, and the impact of that union on the people of South Africa up to 1924.

Considering that the British were victorious over the Boers in the bitterly-fought South African War of 1899–1902, the creation of a political union just eight years later, and on terms broadly conducive to Afrikaner interests, might seem surprising at first. Following the Treaty of Vereeniging, which annexed the two Boer republics to Britain but was otherwise generous, the colonial power sought to create a single white identity in South Africa through its imperialistic High Commissioner for South Africa, Alfred Milner. Milner set about the joint tasks of the cultural Anglicization of the Boer community and post-war economic reconstruction. Immigration from Britain was encouraged and English was made the sole medium of instruction in South African schools. When these policies failed and Milner was withdrawn, a more conciliatory approach was adopted. The Afrikaners were allowed to establish moderate political parties like Het Volk and the Oranje Unie, and self-government was granted to the Transvaal and Orange Free State in 1907. Briton and Afrikaner came to realize that they had many interests in common as a single white community surrounded by a large black majority. It also seemed obvious to many that the further integration of the South African economy could and should be facilitated by political union. Wealthy Boer landowners and English-speaking mining magnates alike wanted much the same thing: a cheap and pliable supply of African labour for their farms and mines. The institution of a more comprehensive system of racial segregation across South Africa seemed to be the best way of attaining this goal, and this could only be achieved through union. The South Africa Act was passed in 1909 and became effective in 1910, establishing a unitary state with the status of a dominion of the British Empire.

The immediate consequence for many South Africans was their long-term exclusion from politics. The existing franchise was preserved in all four provinces, which meant that (propertied) non-whites could vote only in the Cape Province, and only whites could stand for parliament. The Mines and Work Act of 1911 enshrined the colour bar and reserved the best jobs for Europeans. The 1913 Land Act confined large numbers of Africans to small parcels of some of the most unproductive land in the country and made the practice of sharecropping illegal, thereby creating a legacy of profound rural poverty and deprivation. The Urban Areas Act of 1923 led to strict residential segregation in the cities. One result of the assault on black rights was the formation of the South African Native National Congress (SANNC), the forerunner of the ANC, in 1912. While Union seemed to mark the ascendancy of Boer political interests with the South African Party of Botha and Smuts the new dominant force, it also led to a split within Afrikaner ranks. The Anglophobic National Party was founded by Hertzog in 1914, and later that year South Africa's controversial entry into the First World War against Germany led to the Afrikaner Rebellion. A dispute over the hiring of black labour in the mines led to the bloody Rand Revolt of 1922, a factor which contributed to Hertzog's victory in national elections in 1924.

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12. “Black African resistance was the most important factor in bringing about the end of the apartheid system.” To what extent do you agree with this statement?

The importance of black African resistance to apartheid in bringing about the eventual demise of the system will no doubt be stressed by many candidates. Resistance began in earnest after DF Malan’s National Party victory in the whites-only election of 1948, and centred on black opposition to the slew of apartheid legislation which followed. The African National Congress (ANC), which had dominated African politics since its founding as the South African Native National Congress (SANNC) in 1912, was energized and radicalized by a new generation of leaders such as Nelson Mandela and Walter Sisulu, who had come to prominence through the Youth League of the movement. A non-violent mass-action Defiance Campaign was launched in 1952 and the famous Freedom Charter adopted in 1955. The government responded by cracking down on the ANC and a long-running treason trial resulted in the acquittal of many of its leading members in 1961. By this stage the ANC, together with the splinter Pan-Africanist Congress led by Robert Subukwe, had already been declared illegal by the Verwoerd government in the aftermath of the notorious Sharpeville massacre of 1960. Forced underground and obviously now at the mercy of a government which was completely unprepared to compromise its apartheid ideology, the ANC embraced the idea of armed struggle and formed a new armed wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe. The result of the Rivonia trial of 1963–1964 was a guilty verdict and the long-term imprisonment of Mandela and other leaders, who came to be seen as symbols of resistance by black South Africans and the international community. The ANC continued to operate in exile under the leadership of Oliver Tambo, and was able to launch sporadic attacks against the apartheid state. Domestically, the black labour movement became more militant and Durban was hit by mass strike action in 1973. With the Soweto riots of 1976 and the death in police custody of Steve Biko a year later, the freedom struggle entered a new and decisive phase. The townships erupted in violence in the early 1980s and became increasingly ungovernable, and a coalition of anti-apartheid groups which included trade unions, known as the United Democratic Front, heaped further pressure on the PW Botha government. Amid fierce international condemnation of apartheid and with Afrikaner voters abandoning the NP for the break-away Conservative Party, Botha used the slogan “adapt or die” to propose limited reforms including the phasing out of so-called “petty apartheid” legislation, and the introduction of a new multi-racial system which included other non-white groups but not the majority black population. These reforms did not go far enough, and despite Botha’s declaration of a state of emergency the liberation struggle intensified. The breakthrough came in 1989 with the resignation of Botha and his replacement with FW de Klerk. De Klerk signaled his intentions to reform apartheid and continued secret meetings with Mandela which his predecessor had initiated. In 1990 the ANC was unbanned and Mandela finally released. The Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) was formed and the different parties began negotiating the transition from white rule. An all-white referendum in 1992 put a final rubber stamp on de Klerk’s position, and despite violence and set-backs a new non-racial constitution was finally agreed. The ANC won the first non-racial elections in 1994 and Mandela became president, with de Klerk as his deputy.

Candidates might mention other factors. These may include the international pressure on the apartheid regime, which turned South Africa into a virtual pariah state and ultimately contributed to the ruin of its economy through sanctions. This pressure grew in the 1960s with the independence of many former colonies in Africa, and reached a climax in the 1980s. Easing Cold War tensions towards the end of the same decade meant that Pretoria could no longer depend on the diplomatic support of the US by invoking the “communist” bogey of the ANC. Some historians argue that white business leaders had come to the conclusion by the 1970s that the apartheid system was no longer conducive to economic growth, and that they petitioned the government to initiate reforms. Still others assert that the decision to dismantle apartheid was a purely internal one based on a rational assessment of what was in the best long-term interests of the Afrikaner people. It would be difficult to escape the conclusion, however, that African resistance to apartheid was a very important factor, and this should be the primary focus of any strong response to the question.

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Africa under colonialism 1890–1980

13. Compare and contrast the system of colonial administration established by the British in Nigeria with that of the French in Senegal.

The colonial histories of Senegal and Nigeria offer a study in contrast between the British strategy of indirect rule and the French policy of assimilation. Nonetheless, there were also some important similarities in the two approaches. One of these was the common assumption that colonies were to be fiscally self-supporting, with the emphasis on economic development based on the export of cash crops. In Senegal this meant groundnut cultivation. In Nigeria the focus was initially palm oil production, but later on cocoa, cotton and rubber, as well as minerals. The economic relationship between colonizer and colonized was largely exploitative in each case. There was heavy taxation of peasant producers in Senegal, where infrastructure was developed in order to facilitate the export of crops rather than to create an integrated national economy. The model for Nigeria was similarly extractive, with raw materials exported in return for the import of manufactured goods, to the economic benefit of the metropolis. Both administrations made use of forced labour, more systematically so in the case of French Senegal through the use of the *corvée* system. Neglect of food crops in Senegal meant the colony was an importer of rice, while the Nigerian economy was more diversified because local rulers had a greater say in which crops could be produced. In each case moderate nationalist leaders, such as Senghor in Senegal and Azikiwe in Nigeria, were encouraged during the later stages of colonial rule. Besides the economic factors, it can be argued that both Senegal and Nigeria were poorly prepared for the demands of independence in other ways. In Senegal this was because of a weak educational system, where regular schooling was neglected as only a small number of elite schools were established with limited places; in Nigeria because indirect rule encouraged regionalism, and because of the deliberate exclusion of the westernized elite from the professions by the authorities.

One major difference is that while Senegal was part of the federation of French West Africa, Nigeria was governed as a single entity; although strong regional differences in Nigeria meant that the colony was divided into provinces and different administrative models were implemented at different times in different areas. As part of their strategy of indirect rule, the British in Nigeria professed a respect for local tradition and authority, especially that of the Fulani emirs in the north. Contrastingly, one of the cornerstones of French rule was to promote the acculturation of Senegalese through policies of assimilation, although this approach was tempered somewhat after the First World War with a greater stress on the idea of “association”. Citizens of the Four Communes of western Senegal were treated as French citizens with representation in the French National Assembly. In 1946 French citizenship was extended to all Senegalese. Nigerians did not enjoy a similar status in the British Empire. Education in Nigeria placed greater emphasis on religion and tradition, with Quranic schools common in the north. The only education available in Senegalese schools was through the medium of French. In each colony the authorities promoted Christian missionary work, but this was not stressed in Nigeria under Lugard, especially in the north. Missionary activity was more successful among the Yoruba and Igbo. French attempts to bring Christianity to Senegal were largely a failure.

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14. Analyse the nature of Portuguese rule in Mozambique up until 1975.

The seminal features of Portuguese rule in Africa were its relative weakness compared to colonial administrations elsewhere on the continent and the stubborn determination of Lisbon to hang on to its possessions even after other European powers had departed. In the 19th century, however, its control over Mozambique was tenuous at best, and much of the land was administered according to the *prazo* system of large landed estates. Independent leaseholders could raise taxes from the local population and utilize the impoverished Africans as a captive labour force. The economic debility of the colonial power was thus a key factor in determining the nature of Portuguese rule in Mozambique, as Lisbon had little option but to defray the costs of administration by issuing charters. Similarly, the large scale of white migration from metropolis to colony resulted directly from the dearth of employment opportunities available in Portugal.

The precise boundaries of colonial Mozambique were fixed only in 1891. From this point on government policy was to award concessions to huge private enterprises, the most famous of which was the Mozambique Company, which was largely British-owned and ruled over large areas of the southern and central parts of the colony. The chartered companies practiced plantation agriculture using contract labour, and did little to provide infrastructure (apart from constructing railway lines, not to the coast but to neighbouring colonies) or otherwise develop the economy. The colonial authority was frequently required to intervene in order to suppress peasant rebellions. The official policy in those areas under direct Portuguese control was towards selective assimilation, where Africans could in theory enjoy the same political rights as Europeans provided they could demonstrate that they had been sufficiently acculturated. In practice only a tiny number were able to attain *assimilado* status, and the tenor of colonial rule was on the whole racist. In the 1930s Antonio Salazar became dictator of Portugal and the *Estado Novo* was proclaimed. Mozambique officially became an overseas province of Portugal in 1951. The mass immigration of settlers from the metropolis was encouraged after the Second World War as company charters were rescinded. Settler cotton cultivation was promoted and this had the effect of further impoverishing the population in rural areas, where local administration was patchy and often brutal. A radicalized urban black and *mulatto* elite launched the Marxist Movement for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO), with Eduardo Mondlane as president, in 1962. In 1964, FRELIMO launched a guerrilla insurgency in northern Mozambique, to which Salazar responded by sending thousands of troops from Portugal. The result was a decade-long independence war which ended only after the overthrow of Salazar's successor, Caetano, in a military coup in Portugal in 1974. The new military government granted independence to Mozambique in 1975.

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Social and economic developments in the 19th and 20th centuries 1800–1960

15. “The Independent Church Movement developed and flourished because many Africans viewed the missionary churches as an extension of colonial rule.” With reference to *one* region, to what extent do you agree with this statement?

Some of the candidates answering this question may strongly agree with the statement. The independent churches first emerged when they broke away from the mission churches in the late nineteenth century, largely as a result of the reluctance of the European churches to anoint Africans to the priesthood or promote Africans to the church hierarchy. By this time the close association between church and colonizer had already been formed in the minds of many Africans. Early pioneering missionaries in Africa such as David Livingstone, while unsuccessful in their proselytizing, had been keen advocates of colonization, which they imagined would play a key role in bringing Christianity and civilization to the continent. The establishment of the first missions was followed by formal colonization which in turn seemed to result in the creation of more missions, in a relationship that appeared to be complementary and mutually reinforcing. The optimism and idealism of many early missionaries was soon seen to be misplaced as some of the more brutal features of colonial rule became apparent, and priests were at the forefront of protests against iniquities such as forced labour and the hut tax. Some of the more radical missionaries influenced the first generation of African nationalists such as John Chilembwe in Nyasaland. Others were far less critical and preached quietism, and could often come across as agents of the colonial order. This impression offset many of the more obvious material benefits offered by the missions, such as the provision of schooling and medical care, in convincing Africans to break away and form independent churches. Independent churches were particularly popular in those parts of the continent where missionaries had been most vigorous in their assault on traditional practices such as polygamy and female genital mutilation, such as in Ibgoland in Nigeria and Kikuyu country in Kenya. Pioneers of the independent churches were often inspired by the feats of Africans who had successfully resisted colonial expansion – the so-called Ethiopian Churches in South Africa sprung up following Menelik’s defeat of the Italians at Adowa. Candidates could point out that a key reason for the popularity of independent churches was not so much the perception that the mission churches were complicit with colonialism, but rather because of the brutal nature of the colonial regime itself. The Africanist churches were most popular in countries like South Africa, Congo, Malawi, Mozambique and Cote d’Ivoire where the effects of policies such as land expropriation, forced labour and hut tax were more far reaching and profound than in other parts of the continent. They were seen by many of the displaced and desperate as a familiar place of refuge.

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16. **“Colonial rule succeeded in bringing modern and effective systems of education to Africa.” Evaluate this statement with specific reference to *two* countries.**

Some candidates may disagree with the statement and they might argue that most colonial powers never really intended to bring a modern and effective system of education to Africa in the first place. By and large European needs were seen as paramount by colonial officials, and this was also true when it came to the provision of education to Africans. This meant that economic concerns dominated educational policy, although these were sometimes counter-balanced by the moral imperative of a civilizing mission (in the case of missionary schools, and occasionally in French colonies) or later on by the requirement to prepare Africans for self-government. During the early period, while a functioning colonial administration was still being established, education was provided almost entirely by missionaries. The quality of education was variable and it was obviously inaccessible to much of the population, but it did focus on developing literacy and many mission-educated men went on to attend university in the metropolis and later on to become leaders of the nationalist movement. In colonies of white settlement the situation was often quite different. In Kenya and elsewhere, government grants to mission schools were made dependent on the adoption of a vocational curriculum which would better serve the needs of the white community. Objections to an academic education were sometimes more strategic: Lugard argued that the creation of an educated middle class might result in the transmission of the “Indian disease” of nationalism to Africa. In the 1920s, with more racist attitudes to the forefront, a British Colonial Office Advisory Committee recommended that government schooling should be provided for all Africa children. However, the attitude of the committee was paternalistic, and its report argued that Africans should be “adapted” to a role in colonial society and economy that was commensurate to their limited abilities. Lessons were to be taught in the vernacular rather than English, and in subjects like hygiene and agriculture. This model was hardly likely to equip Africans to meet the challenges of developing a post-independence economy. In contrast, the educational model followed in the French colonies was distinctly elitist. While it was true that a minority of gifted Africans could rise up through the system and attend the top universities in France, the vast majority of people received no education whatsoever either from missionaries or the state. In some parts of West Africa such as northern Nigeria and the French colonies, Islamic schooling was the norm. This was not provided by the colonial authorities. Across the continent, secondary education was slight compared to the more widespread provision of primary education. Outside of South Africa, where tertiary education tended to be the preserve of the minority white population, very few universities were established during the colonial period. Makerere in Uganda, Ibadan in Nigeria and Legon in the Gold Coast were among the exceptions. The most extreme examples of colonial administrations under developing their territories were to be found in the Belgian and Portuguese colonies, where education for Africans was almost completely neglected. In the Congo there was virtually no education at all beyond the first two grades of primary school, and the country had only a handful of university graduates when it became independent. On the other hand, candidates would be right to stress the serious tradition of academic education which endured throughout the colonial era in some British colonies such as the Gold Coast and Sierra Leone.

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Nationalist and independence movements (Eastern and Central Africa)

17. Assess the reasons why Tanganyika achieved independence relatively peacefully, while Kenya won its independence only after the armed uprising of the Mau Mau.

In 1919, The League of Nations awarded Britain the mandate to govern the former German colony of Tanganyika. The territory then became the trustee power in 1946 following the establishment of the United Nations. The colony which Britain inherited from the Germans was politically and economically backward. Under the governorship of Donald Cameron, a system of indirect rule was established across Tanganyika, which identified traditional chiefly authorities and allowed them to exercise limited self-rule. The moderate Tanganyika African Association was founded in 1929 with the encouragement of the officials. In 1945 Africans were appointed to the advisory Legislative Council. Government attempts to encourage the development of a plantation economy which might have resulted in more white immigration, most famously with the groundnuts scheme in the years immediately following the Second World War, were all to founder. Following the creation of the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) by Julius Nyerere in 1954, the territory was nudged gradually towards independence, which was finally achieved in 1961.

The colonial history of Kenya was very different. In 1895 it was proclaimed a protectorate and subjected to direct crown rule. The fertile central highlands region was established as a reserve for white settlement in 1903, displacing many Kikuyu from the land. A Legislative Council was created in 1907 and dominated by settler interests. The cultivation of coffee by Africans was prohibited. Mounting African grievances resulted in the establishment of political parties such as Harry Thuku's Young Kikuyu Association and the Luo-based Piny Owacho. These groups felt ignored by a government which seemed responsive only to the demands of the settlers, despite a decision to include a small minority of Africans in the Legislative Council. After the Second World War the more radical Kenya African Union was founded with Jomo Kenyatta as president. In 1952 the Mau Mau Revolt erupted. A State of Emergency was declared and the revolt was vigorously suppressed. The emergency was finally ended in 1956 and independence granted in 1963 following the Lancaster House Conferences.

Some answers may focus on explaining the contrast between Tanganyikan quiescence and Kenyan militancy. While Kenya was a crown colony, Tanganyika was governed as a mandate and later on as a trust territory. In theory at least, this committed the British to administering Tanganyika in the interests of its people and preparing it for eventual self-government. Kenya on the other hand was developed as a colony of white settlement, with a vociferous settler lobby whose interests were inimical to those of the Africans. Fierce competition for land between settlers and Africans, where the government typically sided with the Europeans, was thus a key feature of colonial Kenya. Kenya had a numerically dominant ethnic group, the Kikuyu, whose traditional lands were close to the capital Nairobi, which in turn served as a base for anti-colonial militancy. Tanganyika had no such dominant group, and its numerous ethnicities were scattered across the territory. From the outset political activity was more national, and less ethnic, in character. This factor also explains why mature nationalist politics only developed in the 1950s in Tanganyika, with Nyerere at the forefront. Kenya by contrast was this time in the throes of the emergency. Candidates may stress certain practices that were particular to Kikuyu society, such as oath-taking, which accounted for the singular nature of the Mau Mau Revolt. Finally, the Cameron model of indirect rule in Tanganyika meant that existing authorities were for the most part left to their own devices. The pattern of collaboration between chiefs and colonial administrators in Kikuyu country was altogether more intense and disruptive. The Mau Mau Revolt thus had the character of a Kikuyu civil war between the traditional chiefly elite on the one hand, and an emerging, better educated and more radical generation of leaders on the other. Some candidates may present the argument that far from bringing Kenyan independence forward, the emergency actually delayed it.

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18. Examine the reasons for, and the results up to 1980 of, the liberation war fought in Zimbabwe.

Under the administration of the British South Africa Company, Rhodesia was developed as a white settler colony. The abrogation of the company’s charter in 1923 meant that it came directly under crown rule. The minority white population voted against absorption into South Africa and went on to dominate the politics of the colony, which was in effect self-governing. As in South Africa, segregationist policies were followed, with the result that much of the best land was reserved for white farmers. Black opposition mounted following the creation of the Central African Federation, a short-lived union (1953–1963) of Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, which many African leaders assumed to be a brazen attempt on the part of the authorities to extend white domination over all three territories in the long term. In response, nationalist parties such as the African National Council and the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) were banned by the government. Following the break-up of the federation, Zambia and Malawi were granted independence in 1964. However, the British refused to consider independence for Rhodesia unless white politicians demonstrated their commitment to transferring power to the black majority, an undertaking which the new ultra-conservative government of Ian Smith refused to even contemplate. The deadlock was finally broken in 1965 when Smith announced the illegal Unilateral Declaration of Independence or UDI. The regime persevered on its course despite British anger and international sanctions. Sporadic African armed resistance began in the late 1960s. The Smith regime was supported by South Africa and Portuguese Mozambique. Nationalist politics had meanwhile been splintered by the defection of Robert Mugabe’s Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) from Joshua Nkomo’s ZAPU in 1963. With no prospect of negotiation with the Smith government on the horizon, both groups launched an all-out liberation war in 1972.

The most obvious consequence of the war was the transition to majority rule, followed by full independence for Zimbabwe. In 1975 Mozambican independence from the Portugal changed the strategic balance of power in the region. A year later, Nkomo and Mugabe temporarily put aside their differences to form the Patriotic Front (PF), which began to operate from bases inside Mozambique and Zambia. The guerrilla war moved into a decisive new phase. Following the withdrawal of military support by South Africa and a series of peace proposals by Henry Kissinger, Smith finally recognized the need to compromise. He entered into negotiations with the moderate leader of the United African National Council (UANC), Bishop Muzorewa, and agreed to the establishment of a multi-racial system. Muzorewa became prime minister in a transitional government following elections in 1979, but these were boycotted by the PF and the war continued. The situation was finally resolved after talks chaired by the British government at Lancaster House. UDI was renounced, Rhodesia was briefly returned to British rule, and fresh elections were held in 1980. ZANU-PF was the overwhelming victor and Mugabe became the first prime minister of an independent Zimbabwe. Candidates might also highlight the human cost of the war. As many as 30,000 people were killed, the large majority of whom were black Africans. Atrocities were committed by both sides and this had the effect of embittering relations between black and white, with many white Rhodesians opting to leave the country shortly after independence. The Ndebele-dominated ZAPU and Shona-dominated ZANU were fierce rivals for much of the conflict. Despite the temporary truce of the Patriotic Front and Nkomo’s decision to serve in Mugabe’s cabinet, tensions began to rise in Matebeleland soon after independence as a result of what was perceived in

some quarters as the Shona domination of the new Zimbabwe. Any discussion of the later Gukurahundi campaigns, or of the later restitution of white-owned land by the government, lies outside the scope of the question, however.

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Nationalist and independence movements (Southern and West Africa)

19. Discuss the reasons why, in 1957, the Gold Coast (Ghana) became the first African country to achieve independence.

Britain emerged victorious from the Second World War, but with her status as a colonial power seriously reduced. Many Africans, including Ghanaians, had fought in the war and witnessed British weakness and vulnerability first-hand. The new Labour government was less committed than previous administrations to the idea of empire. Post-war economic weakness led to India being granted independence in 1947, a possible precedent which increased expectation levels in Africa. The Burns Constitution of 1946 was the most progressive on the continent at the time and provided for a majority of elected members in the Legislative Council. Its promulgation set the Gold Coast on a path towards eventual self-government. Politically, economically and socially, the colony was perhaps the most advanced in West Africa. The establishment of a cash crop economy centred on cocoa production had led to the emergence of a large and prosperous middle class. A comprehensive system of government schooling resulted in the Gold Coast having the best-educated population in the region. Guggisberg's legacy as governor in the 1920s meant that unlike in other colonies, many Africans were already employed in the civil service. Moderate nationalist politicians like Africanus Horton, John Mensah Sabah and SRB Attah-Ahoma were respected and encouraged by the authorities. However, widespread rioting broke out in Accra and other cities in 1948 and this had the effect of suddenly radicalizing a political milieu which had hitherto been dominated by the elite. Kwame Nkrumah broke away from the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC) to found the Convention People's Party (CPP), which soon built a broad base of popular support across the colony with its demand for immediate self-government. The result was that Ghana's slow path to independence was dramatically accelerated. A new constitution in 1951 established an elected assembly but did not go far enough for Nkrumah, who launched a successful "Positive Action" campaign of strikes and non-violent resistance which resulted in his imprisonment by the authorities. After an overwhelming victory for the CPP in Legislative Council elections, Nkrumah was released and offered the position of "leader of government business", which he accepted. In the ensuing years he was made prime minister and the Legislative Council assumed the mantle of government. In 1956 the assembly voted unanimously to authorize the government to appeal for full independence within the British Commonwealth, a request which was granted in 1957 as colonial Gold Coast became independent Ghana.

Besides the above factors, candidates might also point out the relative ethnic harmony of the Gold Coast, where in contrast to the situation in Nigeria, there was little by way of regional rivalry. Nkrumah was able to build a strong base of support even among the Asante. The wider context of international relations might also be highlighted as a factor, with Britain mindful of how post-colonial influence over its colonies might best be preserved through the granting of early independence, and wary of how any more delays might result in further political radicalization and the possibility that newly independent nations might establish ties with the Soviet Union. Nkrumah's radical leanings were clearly a factor in the decision not to delay independence any further. Candidates might also allude to the contrast between British indirect rule and the model of direct rule favoured by other powers such as the French. This may have meant that Britain's emotional attachment to its colonies was perhaps not as strong, resulting in earlier decolonization.

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20. Analyse the reasons why armed struggle played such an important role in the achievement of independence in Angola and Namibia.

Colonial Angola was developed by the Portuguese in order to maximize revenues from the export of cash crops such as coffee, cotton and sugar. Concessions were issued to Europeans to allow them to establish plantations, and the alienation of Africans from the land led to frequent wars between the government and the Mbundu, Ovambo and Bakongo peoples. The result was that Angola was not entirely brought under the control of the colonial power until well into the 1920s, and never fully pacified. The use of forced labour was an integral feature of the Angolan economy. Peasants were heavily taxed and rebellion was frequent and widespread. The colony was woefully underdeveloped by the Portuguese and the education system for black Africans utterly inadequate. The authorities encouraged white immigration from Portugal in the 1950s and Angolan society became increasingly stratified along racial lines. Simmering resentment translated into political radicalism and parties emerged that were committed to the armed overthrow of the colonial power. Ethnic division and Cold War rivalry contributed to the emergence of three distinct groups: the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) led by Agostinho Neto, which had a powerbase in Luanda and Mbundu and enjoyed the external backing of the Soviet Union; Holden Roberto's National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), which had a Bakongo support base and the backing of the Americans; and National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) led by Jonas Savimbi, which was backed by China and South Africa and based in the Ovimbundu region in the central and southern parts of the colony. The independence war erupted in 1961 and involved all three groups in the fighting. It was vigorously countered by the Salazar regime which sent large numbers of troops to Angola and introduced a series of belated and limited reforms in an unsuccessful attempt to placate African opinion. The lack of any serious willingness by the government to enter into talks with the insurgents, together with the rivalries between the three liberation armies, meant that a negotiated settlement leading to Angolan independence would prove elusive. It was only in 1975, after a military coup had overthrown Salazar's successor, Caetano, a year earlier, that Angola became independent.

Namibia became a mandated territory of the League of Nations under South African administration in 1920. In 1946 the South African government refused to agree to the transfer of the mandate to a trusteeship, which would have placed the administration of the territory under the close supervision of the international community. South West Africa was instead to be governed as a "fifth province" of South Africa. Segregationist laws were strictly enforced and the majority of people were discriminated against and disenfranchised, with only the white minority enjoying representation in the South African parliament in Cape Town. Apartheid laws were introduced following the election of the Malan government in South Africa in 1948. This only served to exacerbate the deprivation of Africans at a time of economic growth due to the international demand for diamonds and beef. After a lengthy legal dispute with Pretoria, the UN opted in 1966 to revoke South Africa's mandate and its occupation became illegal. It had become clear by this stage, however, that the apartheid government had no intention of relinquishing its hold on Namibia through negotiation. In 1958, the Ovamboland People's Association had been founded with the objective of ridding Namibia of South African rule through armed conflict, and in 1960 this movement was reconstituted as the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO). SWAPO used bases in Zambia to launch its insurrection in 1966. The insurgency was to intensify in subsequent years, especially after 1975, when Angola became independent and provided an ideal new base for attacks. South Africa's response was to invade and occupy southern Angola, an occupation which it persistently denied until its unexpected military reversal at the hands of Cuban and Angolan forces at Cuito Cuanavale in 1988. Up to this point South Africa had refused to recognize the appointment of UN Commissioners for Namibia and obstructed international efforts to reach a negotiated settlement, meaning SWAPO had little option but to continue fighting. The breakthrough was reached in 1988 only after South Africa acknowledged the economic cost and military futility of its campaigns in

Namibia and Angola, and as improving relations between Washington and Moscow threatened to leave Pretoria out in the diplomatic cold. Accords were signed in New York which committed South Africa to a military withdrawal and the transfer of the territory to the UN. Elections were held in 1989 which resulted in SWAPO winning 57 per cent of the vote. Sam Nujoma became the first president of independent Namibia in 1990.

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Post-independence politics to 2000

21. With reference to any *two* countries, analyse the factors that have contributed to the outbreak of civil wars in post-independence Africa.

The factors that contributed to the occurrence of civil wars in Africa are many and varied. Candidates may well refer to the prevalence of post-independence ethnic rivalry, and identify this as a legacy of the often arbitrary carve-up of the continent by European powers in the late 19th century. Ethnic antagonism was compounded where it felt that one or more groups were being excluded, or where one group dominated in the centre. Igbo grievances fuelled the civil war in Nigeria, and resentment at what was perceived as Amhara domination was a major factor in the Tigrean and Eritrean-led civil war against the Mengistu regime in Ethiopia. The civil war in Angola was also in part an ethnic conflict, with the different groups having their powerbases in different regions of the country.

The policies of the colonial governments also contributed to growing discord between different groups. For instance, certain ethnicities were often identified as collaborative partners at the expense of others, as in the case of Rwanda and Burundi where the Germans and later the Belgians groomed the Tutsi as an administrative elite at the expense of the majority Hutu. Religious factors have also been an important factor. Divisions between the Muslim north and Christian south of Sudan were a contributing factor in the conflict there quite apart from the obvious ethnic divide, and the presence of militant Islamist groups in Somalia contributed to the disintegration of that country and its descent into civil war. Competition for economic resources within a state might also be identified as a factor. The Igbo in Nigeria resented the way in which revenues from their oil-rich region were being utilized by the federal government, and Igbos were in turn suspected by Lagos of planning to grab power and use the oil revenues for themselves. The conflict in the Sudan was partially caused by competition over the oil and gas supplies in the central and southern parts of that country. The civil war in the Congo in the 1960s was caused by the attempted secession of the mineral-rich Katanga region from the rest of the country, and competition for control of the Congo's rich resources has been an equally important factor in its more recent civil war. The civil conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone were complicated by the lucrative trade in "blood diamonds".

The weakness, corruption, and brutality of existing governments might also be identified as causes of revolt, and most civil wars in Africa have had at least one of these factors in common. The brief civil war in Uganda (which also involved outside intervention by Tanzanian forces as well as Ugandan exiles) which led the overthrow of Idi Amin would represent a perfect case study. Civil wars in Africa have also been fought over ideology, with the presence of Marxist governments in Ethiopia, Angola and Mozambique being one reason for the conflict in each of those countries. Compounding this was the rivalry between the US and Soviet Union during the Cold War. The destabilizing presence of a hostile cross-border power has also been a factor in civil conflicts. South Africa contributed to the civil wars in both Angola and Mozambique by backing UNITA and the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) respectively. Environmental crises and overpopulation, leading to droughts, famines and competition for scarce food resources, have also been major causes of the civil wars in Ethiopia, Somalia, Rwanda and Burundi. Candidates may also identify factors which are specific to a particular country, such as the presence of a clan-based social system in Somalia, or the personal ambitions of leaders such as Jonas Savimbi in Angola or Charles Taylor in Liberia.

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22. **“The return to multiparty democracy in African countries in the 1980s and 1990s has been a failure.” With reference to any *two* independent African countries, to what extent do you agree with this statement?**

Responses to this question will vary considerably as candidates have a vast range of countries from which to choose. As might be expected, it can be argued that some were reasonably successful in their return to multiparty democracy during the period, while others were not. Strong answers should point not just to political factors, but also include a more general assessment of how democratic leaders have tackled issues such as economic development, poverty, disease, corruption, women’s rights and illiteracy. For example, candidates might refer to the economic growth experienced in the 1990s in newly democratized countries in East Africa.

The following represents a brief sample of the sort of answers that might be expected. Nigeria’s experience of multiparty democracy during the period was variable. A brief democratic experiment came to an abrupt end in 1983 when a military coup overthrew the civilian authorities. President Babangida attempted to restore democracy in 1993 but multiparty elections won by Moshood Abiola were hijacked by Sani Abacha, who restored military rule. It was only after Abacha died that elections were once again held and civilian rule restored in 1999. Throughout this period, an oil-rich nation was dogged by slow economic growth and rampant corruption. Clearly, the return to multiparty democracy had been a failure. There was a promising early sign for democracy in Uganda 1985, when the Obote dictatorship was overthrown and replaced in 1986 by Yoweri Museveni. The new government committed itself to upholding human rights and the rule of law and developing a true multiparty system. While the economy did grow impressively under his rule, Museveni was firmly ensconced in power by 2000 despite the trappings of multipartyism, and his continued commitment to human rights was at best questionable. The term “African Renaissance” was coined by Thabo Mbeki in 1994 to refer to the advent of a new generation of democratically accountable leaders such as Meles Zenawi and Frederick Chiluba, as well as Museveni. The results for the remainder of the 1990s in these countries were mixed. Chiluba delivered strong economic growth, but it benefited only a narrow elite of Zambians and his government became embroiled in corruption scandals. Two of the main protagonists of Mbeki’s new democratic order in Africa, the erstwhile allies Meles of Ethiopia and his Eritrean counterpart Isaias Afewerki, fought a damaging and arguably pointless border war beginning in 1998. This did, however, have the effect of allowing each to silence internal opposition. Nonetheless, the Ethiopian economy was showing some signs of improving by 2000. Candidates might point out that the introduction of democracy led to a change in government in countries such as Zambia, but not in others such as Kenya, where Daniel Arap Moi introduced democratic reforms under American pressure but used violence and intimidation to win elections. Meanwhile Ghana, following the transition from military government to multiparty democracy under Jerry Rawlings in 1992, has since stood out as one of Africa’s major success stories.

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Africa, international organizations and the international community

23. Evaluate the response of the League of Nations to the Abyssinian Crisis of 1935–1936, and examine the consequences of that response for Ethiopia *and* the League.

Some candidates may argue that the response of the League of Nations to Italian aggression in Ethiopia was very weak, and that this was a factor which ultimately destroyed its credibility as a peacekeeping organization. Already weakened by its inability to stop Japanese aggression in invading Manchuria in 1931 and the failure of the Disarmament Conference of 1932–1934, the Abyssinian Crisis presented the League with a final opportunity to demonstrate its commitment to the principle of collective security. Following a skirmish between Italian and Ethiopian troops at the disputed border garrison of Walwal, Ethiopia referred the case to arbitration. Despite the subsequent build-up of Italian troops in Eritrea and Somaliland constituting clear evidence of preparations for an invasion, the League limited the scope of its deliberations to the Walwal incident, and finally exonerated both sides of any blame. Following the invasion of October 1935 Italy was declared the aggressor, and economic sanctions were imposed. These measures were of little use, however, because they excluded the raw materials that were crucial to Italy's war effort such as oil, coal and steel, and because the US as a non-member of the League was not bound by any sanctions. Italy's military campaign went unchecked by the international community and its army duly conquered Ethiopia in May 1936. Candidates might argue that the response of the League was undermined by the actions of its leading two members. The British could have closed the Suez Canal to Italian shipping at any moment and severely hampered the invasion, but they chose not to. The French, who were more concerned with the threat posed by Nazi Germany, had earlier indicated to the Italians what they could have a free hand in Abyssinia. France and Britain tried to hatch a plan whereby Mussolini would be persuaded to call off the invasion in return for two thirds of Ethiopia's territory (the Hoare-Laval Pact). The plan went behind the back of the League and contributed to its undermining.

The results for the League were nothing short of calamitous. Faith in its ability or even willingness to act in upholding the principle of collective security was shattered. Aggression by one member state against another was seen to pay dividends. Italy resigned from the League and her relations with France and Britain were soured. Mussolini was gradually drawn into an alliance with Hitler which resulted in a strong revisionist challenge to the international order, eventually culminating in the outbreak of the Second World War. Ethiopian independence came to an end as the country was incorporated into the new Italian colony of Italian East Africa (AOI), with Victor Emmanuel of Italy declared its emperor. The invasion had been brutal, with the indiscriminate use of chemical weapons by the Italians, as well as destructive, with more than half a million Ethiopians killed. Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie was forced into exile. Italy never succeeded in fully pacifying Ethiopia. An invasion force comprising of fighters from the Ethiopian patriot resistance under the command of the British army finally brought Italy's occupation of Abyssinia to an end in 1941.

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- 24. Analyse the reasons why *either* the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) or the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) met with only limited success in achieving greater economic and political integration in their respective regions up until 2000.**

ECOWAS was founded in 1975 in Lagos with the aim of promoting economic integration among its fifteen member states and across the West Africa region. Candidates may immediately challenge the question by arguing that ECOWAS had since its inception no explicit commitment to political integration. Nonetheless, one of its main functions has been to promote better political relations among its members, with conflict prevention and resolution identified as a principle focus. Non-aggression protocols were agreed in 1978, 1981 and 1990, and a Protocol on Mutual Defence Assistance established an allied armed force for the region in 1981. From the outset, ECOWAS experienced a number of problems and crises which hindered its efforts to build an effective institutional framework that might lead to greater integration. A dispute between the Director (based in Lome) and Secretary General (based in Lagos) of the organization hamstrung its operations until 1979. The expulsion of migrant workers from Nigeria shortly afterwards followed a financial crisis in that country and, contrary to ECOWAS agreements regarding visa-free travel, bedevilled relations between two of its leading members, Nigeria and Ghana. The outbreak of civil war in Liberia presented another challenge to ECOWAS. The response was the formation of the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in 1990 to intervene in the war, which it did with some success, but this initiative did as much to highlight divisions within the organization. ECOMOG was dominated by Nigeria, with fellow ECOWAS members Burkina Faso and Cote d'Ivoire supporting the rebel movement of Charles Taylor. ECOMOG was later deployed in 1997 to Sierra Leone and in 1999 to Guinea Bissau. ECOWAS suffered a further setback when Mauritania withdrew in 2000. The organization enjoyed more success on the economic front, and candidates may well challenge the assumption of “only limited success” in the statement. Early efforts focused on developing transport and communications infrastructure across the region. The creation of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (EUMOA) by members sharing the CFA franc currency in 1994 went some way towards the establishment of a single economic community, with the convergence and harmonization of economic and fiscal policies and the creation of a customs union. However, EUMOA excluded non-Francophone countries with the exception of Guinea Bissau. The establishment of a regional development bank, Ecobank, in 1985 was another of ECOWAS's success stories. In addition to the above, candidates might identify the following more general factors which hindered integration: divisions between Francophone and Anglophone countries within ECOWAS; fear among other states of the economic and political domination of Nigeria; and the occurrence of civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone, and arguments between member states about how best to respond to with these conflicts and the issue of refugees from the fighting.

SADCC was formed in 1980 and consisted of nine Southern African countries but not South Africa. Its principal goals were to work towards greater cooperation in long-term economic planning, and to support the freedom struggle against the apartheid regime in South Africa by providing assistance to the ANC wherever possible. In 1990 the community was expanded to include newly-independent Namibia, and it was renamed the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in 1992. South Africa joined the organization in 1994. By any standards, the political and economic achievements of SADCC up to 2000 were very limited. Cold War politics and ideological differences were an important factor in discouraging greater integration in the 1980s, with the Marxist governments in Angola and Mozambique sitting uneasily in the same organization with more pro-western countries like Botswana. Tensions also grew over the question of how to deal with South Africa, with the smaller and more vulnerable frontline states like Lesotho, Swaziland and Botswana having little option but to adopt a more conciliatory line towards Pretoria. Economic growth and co-operation within the region were hampered by the devastating civil wars

in Angola and, in particular, Mozambique. South Africa's transformation from apartheid state to non-racial democracy should be regarded as a triumph for SADCC, with frontline states playing a crucial role during the armed struggle by harbouring ANC military bases. However, the admission of South Africa in 1994 led to new challenges for the organization. Hopes that South Africa would be an engine for economic growth in the region and an equal partner in assisting in the development of her neighbours were balanced by fears that Pretoria might try to economically exploit its weaker fellow members. There was some disquiet over South African funding of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project, with critics alleging that Pretoria would use the scheme to politically and economically dominate the mountain kingdom. Similar concerns were raised about the rehabilitation of the Cabora Bassa hydroelectric project in Mozambique. Towards the end of the period, questions over how to deal with the economic crisis in Zimbabwe and the treatment of opposition by the Mugabe regime placed further strains on SADCC.

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